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Abstract 
The secure mlllti-party compnt.ation (ShIC) illode1 provitles ineails for l~alailciilg the use 
and confidentiality of distribut.ed data. Iilcreasiilg security coilcerils 11al.e led to a surge in 
work oil practical secure 1nult.i-party coinputatioil protocols. However. inost are only proveil 
secure under the semi-hoilest model, and security under this adversary illode1 is iils~~fici~iit for 
illost applications. I11 this paper: we propose a no\rel frame~vork: accoui~tal~le coinputi~ig (XC)  
framework. ~17llicll is sufficient or practical for man!- applic.ations \vitlioiit the coinplesit,y and 
cost of a ShIC-protocol under the malicious model. F~lrtherinore. to s h o ~  tlie a~)plical~ilit~- of 
t.1le AC-framework. we present an applicatioil under this framework regarding PI-i\-acy-preser\.iilg 
illillillg frequent it,emset,s. . 
1 Introduction 
Privacj- and securit.y, particularly inaintaining confidentiality of data, have become a challenging 
issue wit 11 advances in inforination and coininunicat.ion tec1~i~olog.y. The ability to  coininunicat~e and 
share dat,a has inany benefits. The idea of an oinniscient dat,a source ca.rries gfeat value t,o research 
and data disseinination. Mjit.nessing t,lle cost of duplicat,ed medical tests or the darnage from errors 
result.ing froin incoinp1et.e or incorrect informat,ion, such a data source could substantially reduce 
waste and inefficiency. 
On t.he ot.her hand: an omniscient. data source eases misuse: such as t.he gron-ing problein of 
iclent.it.~i t,l~eft. To prevent inisuse of data; there is a recent surge in laws inanda.t.ing prot.ection of 
confident.ia1 dat,a; such as t.he European Coinmunit,y privacy standards [5]. U.S. llealt hcare la.~vs [ll]; 
and California. SB1386. Ho\vever, t,llis prot.ect.ion coines wit.11 a real cost through bot.11 added securit.y 
expendit.ure and penalties and c0st.s associat.ed wit.11 disclosure. For example, CardSyst.eins ~ 7 a s  
terininat.ed by Visa and Ainerican Express aft.er having credit card infbrinat.ion st.olen. Cl~oicePoint 
st,ock lost. 20% of it.s value in the inontl~ follo~ving t.lleir disclosure of inforination t.heft. Such public 
relations costs can be enorinous and could poteilt,ially kill a company. Fi-om lessoils learned in 
pract.ice, what. we need is the ability to coinpute the desired "beneficial out.coine" of data. sharing 
without. having t.o act,ually share or disclose dat.a.. We can inaint,ain t.he security provided by 
separation of cont.ro1 while st,ill obtaining the benefits of a global dat.a source. 
Secure mu1t.i-part.y roinput,at,iorl (SAIC) [8: 19: 201 has recent,ly emerged as an ansm:er t.o t.his 
problem. Informally, if a protocol ineets t,he Sh4C definitions, t,he part,icipat,ing part.ies learn inere 
t.he final result and n:hat.ever can be iilferrcd froin t . 1 ~  final result and their o ~ c n  inputs. A simple 
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disclosing their act,ual wealt.11 t.o each ot.l~er. Recognizing t,llis, the research community has developed 
inally SMC prot.ocols, for applicat.ions as diverse as forecast.ing [3]. data anal!-sis [12] and auctions 
[14].' 
Forinal definit,ions of ShdC exist for two adversary models: semi-honest and malicious. I11 the 
semi-honest, model, it, is assumed t.11at. each part,y follows t.he prot.0~01. Ho\ve\:cr. aft.er t.he prot.0~01 
is complete, t , l~e  adversary may att.einpt, t.o compute adclitional i~iforination from t , l~e  inessages 
received during execut,ion. I11 t.he inalicious model, a part?- can di\-crge arbit.rari1:. froin norinal 
execution of t.he prot.0~01. It, has been proven that  for aay pol!;nomial time algorithm, there exists 
a polyilo~nial t i n e  secure prot,ocol t,l~at. achieves t.he same funct.ionalit!. liilder eit,l~er the semi-1lonest 
or t.he inalicious inodel [8]. Nevert.l~eless, most pract,ical algorit.l~ins developed have only been proveil 
secure under the semi-honest model. While not a proof, this certainly gi\,es evidence that achieving 
security against a inalicious adversary adds significailt complexity and expense. 
A ShlC-protocol secure under the semi-honest inodel (or a SS31C-protocol) rarely pro\~ides 
sufficient security for practical applications. For example. t\vo coinpeting trailsport at ion conipanies 
want to know if they can collaborate to acllieve better cfficienc;\. and coiisequentl\~ reduce operational 
costs. Assume there exists a SShJC-protocol that searches for possible overlap of the two companies' 
trucking routes. It is difficult t.o convince the companies to utilize the prot,ocol because it is 
uilacceptable to  assume that, t.wo colnpet,ing companies t.rust, each other to follo~v t.he prot.0~01. On 
t.he ot.ller hand, if one company can guarant,ee the other coinpan>s t.llat it llas behaved l lonestl~~ 
during each execution st.ep of t.he protocol, then a collaboration bet\~:een the two part.ies becomes 
possible. A SMC-protocol secure under the inalicious model (or a AIShIC-prot,ocol) generally 
provides such a guarantee, but t.he comp1exit.y of a h4SMC-protocol commonly prevents it froin 
being adopted in pract,ice. 
Iinagiile another scenario: multiple pa.rt.ies authorized t,o see each other's data \milt. t.o coinput,e 
a shared result; nevert,heless, open disclosure of t.he dat.a to  11011-pal-ticipatillg part.ies is prol1ibit.ed. 
I11 order to avoid the cost or liability from disclosiilg the data. every partv finds that its best interest 
is to follow a protocol secure under the semi-honest inodd. \T-liat happens if data is disclosed? 
Clearly it is the fault of the original owner of the data provided that other parties follo\ved the 
protocol. On the other hand. since a party may have beha\-ed dishonestl;\~. the owner can accuse 
others and claim that  liability sholild be shared. At this point. the otllei party would like to prove 
that they did follo~v the protocol and consequently sllo\v that the!- could not have seen the data 
(unless the owner had behaved disllonestly). The scenario leads 11s to a new framework: accountable 
coinputiilg (AC). 
The idea behind the AC-framework is that a party ~ v h o  correctly follo\ved the protocol call be 
proven to have done so consequent,ly prove t.hat someone else inlist have improperly disclosed 
dat,a. This provides subst,ailt,ial practical ut.ility over a semi-lionest protocol. I11 a.ddit,ion, although 
a inalicious adversary part,icipat.ing in an AC-protocol may learn t.l~ings t.hat. they should not. and 
damage the result, such a behavior could be detect.ed under t,he AC-framework. Furthermore, 
since t,lle AC-fi-aine\voi-k does not need t.o prevent, disclosure t.o a inalicious a.dversary, prot.ocols 
call be less complex. I11 part,icular, inucll of t.he cost, call be pushed t.o a verificat.ion phase \vhich 
needs oilly be run t o  expose the culprit \vhen disclosure is detect.ed. This enables prot.ocols t.hat 
approach the efficiency of semi-honest protocols and leads t.o many practical applicatioils for which 
t.he semi-honest protocols are insufficient.. 
The goal of this paper is to introduce and analyze the AC-fi-aine~vork as well as to deinonstrate 
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its pract.ica,lity. Sectioil 2 preseilt,s current state of the art froin t,he lit.erat(u1.e of secure inulti- 
part,? computat,ion. Sect.ion 3 int.roduces the framework and provides guidelines for designing an 
AC-prot,ocol. Sect,ion 4 illust.rat,es t.lie feasil>ilit~- an(] applicability of the fra11ien:ol.k in tlle field of 
privacy-preserving dat.a mining. Finall!.. section 5 concludes t.he paper. 
2 Related Work / Background 
We first give a descriptioil and defi~litions of Secure Xlultiparty Computation: these are necessary 
to uilderstaild the rest of tlle paper. IYe then discuss two proposed ideas that appear similar to 
our proposed AC-fraine\~ork. and highligllt the differences. 
2.1 Secure Multi-party Computation 
Yao first postulated t.lie t.uio- part.^^ comparison problem (Yao's hlillionaire Prot.0~01) and developed 
a provably secure sollit ion [20]. This was est encied to multipa,rty coinput at i o ~ ~ s  by Goldreich et 
al. [8]. They developed a framework for secl~re 1nult.iparty computation, and in [9] proved t.hat. 
coinput,iilg a function privat.ely is equi~alent to coinput,ing it securely. 
We st.art. \vit,h the definit,ions for security in tlle semi-11onest inodel. A semi-honest, part.y (also 
referred to  as honest but. curious) follo~vs tllc rnles of t,he protocol using its correct, input.. but  is 
free t.o later use \vhat it. sees during execut.ion of the protocol t.o co~nproinise security. 
A formal defiilitioil of privat,e t,n:o-party coinpl~tatioil in t.he semi-honest. inodel is given below. 
Definition 1 Let f : (0; I}* x (0. I}* - (0. I}* x (0. I}* be a functionality, a.nd f l (x :y )  (resp., 
f2(x: y)) denote the ,first (resp., second) element of f (x. y) .  Let II be two-party protocol for com- 
puting f .  The view of the ,first (resp., second) party during an execution of II on (x. y), denoted 
VIEW: (x .  y) (resp.; VIEWY (x;  y)): is (x. 1-; ml . .  . . . nrt) (resp., (y. 1-: nxl.. . . . n ~ , ) ) , .  where r repre- 
sents the outcome of the .first (resp., second) party's in.terna1 coin tosses, and n x i  represents th.e ith 
message it has received. The O ~ J T P C T  of the ,first (resp.. second) party during an, execution of II 
on, (x: y), denoted OUTPUT: (x: y) (resp., o c ~ i > u ~ Y  (x: y)) is implicit in the party's own view of the 
execution: and O L T T P U T ~  (x; y) =   OUTPUT:^ (:r, y) .  OUTPUT^ (x. y)) .  
(general case) We say that II privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polyn.omia1-time 
algorithms: denoted S1 and S2, such that 
C {(SI (x. f I  (x. 3 ) ) .  f (x.  y))}, , = { (\~n.: (x.  y) .  OUTPUT^ (x. y))} 
x Y 
C 
{ ( S 2  (3. f 2  (2. Y))  . f (x. Y))} , .~  = ((v1~n-Y (x.  3 ) .  0uTpuTn (2. Y ) ) } ~  
L 
where = denotes computation,al indistin.gu.ishabl:lity by (n.on-un.iform) families of polynom.ia1-size 
circuits. 
The above definition says that a co~nputation is secure if tlle vie\?: of each partv during the 
execution of the protocol can be effect~vely simulated given the input and the output of that party. 
This inodel guarantees that parties 1~110 correctlv follo\v the protocol do not have to  fear seeing 
data  they are not supposed to. 
The malicious inodel (guaranteeing that a inalicious partv cannot obtain private infor~nation 
froin an hoilest one. ainoilg other things) adds coilsiderable complexity due to the fact that the 
consistency of every step of execution \i-ith previous coinputations generally needs to be verified. 
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\171iile we do not give the full definition here. we note that there are three tlliilgs the inodel cannot 
llandle [9]: 
1. Parties refusing t.o participate in t,he prot,ocol; 
2. Parties using other (valid) input in place of their actual data, and 
3. Partics aborting the protocol prematurely. 
\?;hile inany of t,he exist.ing pract.ica1 SMC-st.yle protocols do provide guarantees beyond that 
of t.lie semi-honest, inodel (snch as guaranteeiilg t.l~at, individual data items are not disclosed to  a 
n~alicious  part.^^), few meet all t.he rcquire1nent.s of the inalicious inodel. 
2.2 Other Verification-based Methods 
Ideas proposed in 12; 61 appear similar to what we have present.ed in this paper. However, both of 
them focus on the sit.ua.t ion wllcre \rerifications are inandatory and performed on the fly. This will 
become clear after we det,ail t.hc AC-fraine\vork. Anot.her key dist.inct,ion is that our AC-framework 
call achieve a practical efficiency (in cases where t,llere is no reasoil t.o suspect. inalicious behavior) 
not achievable by previous methods. 
In addition, t.he framework prescntcd in [2] ad0pt.s a game-t.11eoretic approach in that  participates 
arc rat,ional, and using an audit.ing device periodically are expected to provide t,rut,l~ful information. 
3 The AC-Framework 
I11 this sect.ion, we int.roduce the accouiltable coinput.ing (AC) franie\vork. Before presenting details, 
we first, clarify the followiilg t.erminologies: 
SSAlC-prot.0~01: a prot.0~01 secure under t.he semi-honest. inodel in the literat,ure of secure 
mu1t.i-party coinputat ion (ShlC); 
AlShlC-prot.0~01: a prot.0~01 secure under t,he inalicious inodel under t.he cont.ext. of SMC; 
AC-protocol: represe11t.s a prot.0~01 secure in the proposed AC-framework. 
I11 addit.ion to t.he above t.erininologies, the t.erins honest and semi-hon,est are interchangeable for 
the rest of the paper. 
Suppose @ is a protocol sat,isfyiilg all the requireillents under the AC-framework. I11 general, the 
AC-framework provides a participat.iiig part.y ineails t.o prove what it has done during the executioil 
of @ is consist,ent. with honest bel~aviors (expect.ed under t.he semi-llonest inodel). For inst.ance, 
whet.11er or not. a party has followed the prescribed executioil procedures of a protocol could be 
proved in the inodel. For the rest of the chapter; we first. present essential definitions related t.o 
the AC-framework. We conclude the sect.ion by differentiat.ing the AC-framework from the SMC 
inodel. 
Definition 2 (Accountable Behavior) Given a protocol @ under the AC-framework, an ac- 
coun,table behavior rOxo specifies how participatin,g parties should behave, and it has two related 
com.pon,en,ts a ,  P :  
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Veri f ier  cr E {Participating-party. Third-party): on en,tity who oversees and vulidates the 
veri,fication process, where participatin.g-party  indicate.^ the ~:ulidation of the zlerlficution pro- 
cess is supervised by a participating party or parties: and tliird-purty i7adicates the va,lidation, 
is supervised by a third party (i.e.: a court, a govern,m.en.t a.,qency: etc). 
Degree of  disclosure P: speci,fies what inform,ution can be disclosed during the veri,fication 
process. 
According to the above definit,ion, if cr = Pal-ticipat,ing-part,?. T O x 3  can he int.erpreted as: an 
expected (or account,able) behavior call be verified among part,icipating part,ies, and t.he information 
disclosed during the verificat,ion process must be consistent \vit,ll d. 
For practical purpose. we have classified t,he verifiers iiito two categories: part,icipating-party 
and third-party. The AC-frainework allo~vs a part,icipating ]?art.!? to he the verifier so that a well 
established or reput.ahle party has t,lle opport.unit,y t.o evaluate if its first-time collaborator is t.rust,- 
wort,hy. On the obher hand. a relat,ively unkno\vn part,? can 11ave the cllance to prove its credibility 
to the other collaboratiilg partry under t,lie proviso that tlie othei part.!? call be t,rusted based on its 
well-known image or ot,ller reputations. Thus: t.he verification pi.occss could serve as a mechanism 
in building trust, ainoilg participat,ing parties and reduce costs in establishing well-purposed col- 
laboration. I11 case t.here is a disput.e among part.icipating pai.t,ies: tlie verificat.ion process must he 
coilduct,ed under the supervision of a third ei1t.it.y so t,hat any malicious part.y can be held account- 
able. I11 addition, a raildoin verificat.ion can be performed as a spot check t.o audit t,lle integrit,y of 
participating part.ies. 
Degree of disclosure only applies to the verificatioil process. The benefibs of proviilg iilnoceilce 
may outweigh privacy concerns, or only take place in a t.rust.ed en\7iroinnent (e.g., a court,i-oom.) 
This component. allo\vs part,icipat.ing part,ies to  decide what. is more iinport.ant,. If t.he verifier is 
trusted, such as a court,, disclosure of privat,e inforinat.ion to  the court may not be a problenl during 
the verification process. Also, what. call be disclosed during tlie verificat,ion process must be agreed 
on by all relevant participat,ing parties before t,he execution of any AC-prot.oco1. 
Next we define condit,ions that. a protocol needs t,o gnarantee in the AC-frainexvork. 
Definition 3 (AC-protocol) An AC-protocol must sa.tisfy the follo~uin,,q three requirements: 
1. Bas ic  Security:  Without consideration of the verification, process, Q, satis,fies the secu.rity 
requirements of a SSMC-protocol (a SMC-protocol secure under the semi-hon,est m,odel). 
2. Bas ic  Structure:  The execution, of Q, consists of ~ W O  phases: 
C o m p u t a t i o n  phase: Com.pute the prescribed function.ality and store injorn,ation needed 
for the verz'fication process. 
Veri f icat ion phase: An  hon.est party (we name such a pnrty as a prover thereafter) 
can succeed in verifying an accoun.table behavior. 
3. Sound  Verif ication: Q, is soun,d providin,g that the veri.fica.tion phase cannot be fabricated 
by a malicious pnrty. 
Note tliat unlike the computation phase. thc verification pliase stated in Definition 3 is optioilal 
for each run of an AC-protocol. Details follo\v later in the section. 
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3.1 General Assumptions 
I11 this sub-section. we clarifv t ~ v o  key assuinptions adopted tllroughout the framenork: one is 
related to  the nature of involving entities. and the other concerns the number of inalicious parties 
allowed. 
3.1.1 Nature of Involving Entities 
In the AC-framcn-ork. the involving entities coilsist of both t,he verifier and participating parties, 
and nature ~neans  a party behaves either semi-honestly or maliciously u~lder the context of t.his 
paper. 
Nature of Verifier: I11 general, we assume that there is one or a group of verifier(s) and that 
the verifier all\-ays behaves llo~lestly during the verification process. I t  would not make sense to 
have a malicious verifier betause if the inalicious verifier does not want to be convinced. no one call 
succeed in the verification process. 
Nature of Participating Parties: If a participating party is the verifier, we assume it is always 
an honest entit).. Other participating parties can be either semi-honest or malicious. 
3.1.2 Bounds on the Number of Malicious Parties 
For cert.ain nlodels. SMC-protocols only exist. when inajorit,jr of participating parties are l~onest ,~ 
2 aad some sit,uat.ions require a inajorit,y of 3. For this paper, we inerely consider two-part.y prot.ocols 
under t,he AC framework, and we require at  least, one of t,he t.1~0 participating parties is honest. (or 
semi-honest). 
3.2 AC-framework vs. SMC 
Here we lay out the esseiltlal differences bet~veen the AC-framework and the ShIC model. In general, 
AC-protocols should be coinpared with SSMC and hIShIC protocols on the followiilg criteria: basic 
structure. securitj definitions and coinput at ion complexity. 
3.2.1 Basic Structure 
According t.o Defiilit,ion 3, t,he verificat,ion phase along wit,h the accouiltable behavior are t,he key 
feat,ures t , l~at  distiilguish t,he AC-framework froin the Sh4C model. A protocol that. sat,isfies the AC- 
framework needs to co1nput.e not oilly t,he correct. result,s but, also additional infor~nation needed 
for a part,y t.o verify t,he account,able behavior. 
In addit.ion, t,he verifica.t.ion phase is opt,ional for each execut.ion of an AC-protocol. The ver- 
ificat,ion process is performed inerely when t,here is an accusa.t,ion that. a participat,ing part,y did 
not. behave 1~onest . l~  regarding t,he account.able behavior and t,hus may have obtained or disclosed 
inforinat.ion which should not. be leaked if it. behaved semi-honestly. Verifica,tion allows t,he accused 
part,jr who is in fact semi-honest. to prove it,s innocence. 
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3.2.2 Security Definitions 
Uilder the ShlC model, t,lle securit,y definitions are generally based on t,~vo t,ypes of adversaries: semi- 
honest and malicious. On the contrary, the two adversary models are no longer relevant at. least 
from the stand point of a verifier since we assume a verifier always behave semi-honestly as stated 
in section 3.1. Also, we do not enforce ally constraiilt on the behaviors of participating parties, 
and t.hey call be eit,her semi-honest or malicious as long as they are not, verifiers. Furthermore; it, 
is inaccurat,e to assume a party whose actioils need to be proved agaiilst t,he accouiltable behavior 
is semi-honest,. Therefore; security defiilitioils under t.he AC-framework do not. dist.inguis11 between 
a semi-honest adversary and a malicious adversary. 
The AC-framen~ork is more flexible from its security point of view due to the r coinponeilt strated 
in Defiilitioil 2. Since t.he accountable behavior call be anyt,hing, t,he AC-fi-amework is generally 
more applicable t.han t,he SI\/IC model. 
3.2.3 Computation Complexity 
Regardless various accountable behaviors, the coinputatioil complexit,y under the AC-framework is 
classified int.0 two phases: computation phase and verificatioil phase. Coinputatioil phase is required 
for each run of the prot.0~01, and it, produces tlle expect.ed result and all necessary informat.ion 
needed for verificat,ioil phase. Verificatioil process could be optioilal for each run uilless t,here is a 
disput,e or an expect,ed (or accountable) behavior needs t,o be verified. 
The runiliilg time or complexity of an AC-prot.0~01 call be as (or possibly even more) inefficient 
as a hdSh4C-protocol; however, the computation phase of an AC-prot,ocol should be inore efficient 
because the verificat,ion phase of the protocol is not. needed for every run. If the complexity of the 
coinputat,ioil phase of an AC-protocol were comparable to h'ISMC-prot,ocol, t,he hlSh4C-protocol 
would be sufficient and inore effective t,han the AC-prot,ocol for practica,l purposes. Therefore: a 
challenge in desigiling an AC-protocol is t,o ensure t,llat t,he colnputatioll phase is efficient.. 
3.3 Guideline for Designing AC-Protocol 
Based on Definit,ion 3: we outline basic procedures t,hat. can be used to implement. a prot,ocol 
under t . 1 ~  AC-framework. The key procedures highlight,ed in Figure 1 consist. of t,hree part,s: 
behavior specification, computation phase and verificat,ioil phase. 
Behavior specificat,ioil defines what. an expected or account,able behavior is and it.s related 
coinpone11t.s. The ililplement,ation of the computat.ioa phase is t,he same as that of a SSh4C-protocol; 
except that. addibional illformatioil needs t.o be computed for t.he verificatioil phase. St,eps provided 
in t,he verificat.ion phase serve as guidance for a verifier. It needs t,o be proven that a malicious 
part.icipat.ing party cannot convince t,lle verifier t,hat it behaved honestly during the computat,ioil 
phase of the prot,ocol. 
According t,o t,he definit,ions and the guideline presented in t,llis sect,ion, we proceed to present 
a case study that shows 110~; 811 actual dat.a mining talc call be impleinent,ed under t,he AC- 
framework. 
.
n I\ he y wo ypes i :
r ,
. . n n
he n her ,
e n n he n
. , n n he t h
.
ework m n ated
n n h n hing, he ra e r
ha he IVI l.
m n t
o i n m n
ocol, h t ti
i n n n n here
e ed o
n n tocol n
M IVI - ocol m
i .
m ion IVISlVIC-prot l, he l\l M l
m ha c l i l . ,
n o hat he m n
l
i , h t ocol
he t hree s:
ti , i n
ti n able s
m onents. m ati i n he IVIC-pr ,
ti n n o h i n eps
he i o
i i ing he hat ti n
ocol.
o he i s his ion,
how an a sk n m e he
r .
7
I :  Behavior Specification: 
Define a \:erifinble behavior: 
Specif:. its related coinponent.~. 
2: Comput at.ion Phase: 
Design a protocol secure under the semi-lionest model: 
Compute all necessarv inforinatioil t o  support a sound verification process. and ~nodify 
accordingly. 
3: Verificatioil Phase: 
St.at,e verificat.ion procedures including \vho should do what, during t.he verificat.ion process; 
Prove that tlie verification procetlures along with additional inforinatio~~ co~nputed in the 
computation phase constitute a sound \~crification process under Definition 3. 
Figure 1: Guideline for Designing an AC-prot.0~01 
4 Case Study: Finding Frequent Itemsets (FFI) 
Several algorit~hnls have been developed for privacy-preserving associat,ioil rule mining using the 
secure inultipart,y comput.a.t.ion framenrork. hIost are based on the Apriori algorithin [I]; the key 
step is to  securely co1nput.e freqnency of a set, of candidate it,einsets \vit,hout. disclosing each party's 
privat.e dat,aset,. One approach, suggest.ed in 17: 211: is t,o use a secure dot product. prot,ocol. I11 t,his 
section, t.o derqonst,rat.e the usefulness and app1icabilit.y of t.he AC-framework, we first int.roduce 
a secure t,\vo-pal-t.g prot,ocol t.o comput,e frequent it,einset.s under the seini-lionest inodel proposed 
in 17, 211. \;lie t.hen sho117 ho~7  t,o modify such protocol into one t,llat sat.isfies t,he AC-framework, 
allowiilg t,he semi-honest behavior to  be verified. 
4.1 FFI under the semi-honest model (SSMC-FFI) 
The prot,ocols presented in [7, 2:l.l are basically a secure dot. product prot,ocol bet.ween t,wo vectors 
whose ent,ries are eit.her 0 or 1 values. Let Cl. t$ be t,wo vectors wit.h size nz of parties P1 and P 2  
respect,ively, and v'j [i] dei1ot.e~ t,lie i"' bit of Cj. Forinally, define F F I ( G I  : 52) --t 6, where S = GI ti2. 
Let E : R x X --t Y be a probabilistic public key encryption scheme, such as t,hose proposed 
in 14, 13. 161; where R ,  X and Y are fii1it.e doinains ident,ified \vit,h an initial subset. of inbegers 
and D : Y --t X be a privat,e decrypt,ion algorit,hin, such t,l~at. V(r.  x )  E R x X :  D(E(r .  x ) )  = x. 
Furthermore. t,he sclleine has t,he follo\ving propert,ies: 
The encrypt ion fuilct~ioii s inject,ive with respect t,o t.he second parameter, i.e., b'(r 1. X I ) ,  (1-2 ,  x2)  
E R x X ,  E ( r l . x l )  = E ( r 2 , x 2 )  * X I  = x2 
Tlle encryption function is additive hoinomorphic. i.e.. V(?-1 . X I ) .  ( 1 . 2 . 2 2 )  E R x X.  
n ( E ( r l .  x2) .  E(r2 .  x 2 ) )  = E(r3 X I  + x2) .  where 1.3 call be co~nputed froin 1-1. 7-2. 2 1  and 2 2  
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in polynolnial time. (n is the funct.ion t.o "add" two encrypted values; mult,iplicat.ion in the 
svstems lisbed above.) 
The encryption function has semantic security as defined in [lo].  Inforlnally speaking, a set 
of ciphertexts do not provide additional inforlnation about the plaintext to an adversary with 
polynomial-bounded colnputing power. 
The dolllaill and the range of t.he encrypt,ion syst,em is suitable. 
Key st,eps of t,he FFI protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 1. P I ;  at  step 1; encrypt,~ individual 
Algorithm 1 FFI Protocol 
Require: GI. C2. E. \vhere Ii& I = IC21 = m and E has certified public key paralnet.ers 
I :  P I :  
(a). Encrypt, GI: xi t E(r: GI [i]), for i = 1 ; .  . . : m; 
T is randomly chosen for each 6 [i]; 
(b).  Send X I ; .  . . . x,,, t.o P2. 
(a). Compute b + n,,,,,il=l xi; 
(b).  Send 8 to P I .  
3: P I :  
(a). Compute b t ~ ( 8 )  
(b).  Send b t,o P2. 
value in it,s private vect,or and sends them to P2. At step 2(a), the symbol n indicat,es t.hat tlle 
encrypt,ed 6 [i] values are colnbined to produce the encrypted dot product. value denot.ed by 8 ;  t,he 
colnlnon charact,erist,ics among all these values is that their corresponding G2[i] values must. be 1. 
At st,ep 3(a), P1  co1nput.e~ tlle actual dot. product value 6; and P1 sends b t,o P2 at  the end. 
Refer t,o t,able 1 \vl~ere a dat,aset is vertically part,it,ioned between P1 and P2, and it. can be 
reconstructed via one-t.0-one join on tlle global ident.ifier at.tribute Tr#. Assunle P1  and P2 want 
t,o know if {abc) is a frequent. itemset. P1  first. crea.t,es t.he vector G1 = a'/\ g = (1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1) /\ 
(0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1) = (0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 I ) ,  where a', g are t,he column vectors related t,o at,tribut,e a ,  b 
of P l ' s  dataset and A indicates the logic AND operat,or. P2 creates i& = c'= (1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1). 
Aft,er applying the FFI protocol, both parties get GI G2 = 3 wit,l~out disclosing the privat,e vectors 
Gl and G2 tto ea,ch ot.her. If t.he lninilnuln support is 2; t,hen {abc) is one of the frequent. itemsets. 
Details regarding t,lle correct,ness and security analyses of the FFI protocol can be found in [7, 211. 
4.2 Attacks on SSMC-FFI 
Since the FFI prot,ocol presented in Algoritlun 1 is secure under the semi-honest. adversary model, 
it has t,wo vulnerabilit,ies under tlle lnalicious adversary model: 
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Tablc 1: P1 and P2  's Data (left and riglit rcspcctively) 
1. Input ~nodificatio~l after the FFI protocol is initiated: 
2. P 1  sends P 2  incorrect, final result,. 
Although under the malicious model, input. modific.ation cannot be prevented: t,lle input. should not, 
be modified furt.ller once t,he prot.0~01 js jnjt.iated. Any iilt~cilt,ioilally iniscalculatioils at st,ep 1 and 
step 2 are related t,o this issue. Therefore, u~lder the AC-fraine~vork, ally illcoilsist~eilcies at. these 
two streps sholild be det,ect.ed during t.he verificat.io11 phase. 
In addition: even if P 1  receives t,he right. 8 \ralue at. step 3(b), P 1  can seild P 2  any value instead 
of t.he actual b value. As a result; this malicious behavior should be detected under t,he frainework 
whenever it happelis. Next. sect,ioil shows 110117 to chailge t.lle SSAIIC-FFI protocol illto an AC-FFI 
protocol whose ~lerificat~ion phase is capa.ble of det,ect,iilg the t.wo malicious behaviors stat,ed above 
if they have ever occurred during t.he coillput,at,ioil phase. 
4.3 FFI under the AC-Framework (AC-FFI) 
Before illtroduciilg the AC-FFI protocol, we first define the accouiltable behavior rOx3 associated 
with AC-FFI: 
Prevent. input inodificatioil a.fter the iilit,iat,ioil of SSAIC-FFI protocol; 
Prevent P1 froin seildiilg an illcorrect reslilt t,o P 2  at t,he final st,ep; 
p: a random perinut.at.ion of each private input vect,or and t,he final result, of AC-FFI call be 
disclosed t.o t,he t.hird part.y verifier. 
Note t,llat raXo implies t,he prevent.ion of an;r malicious behavior in t,he comput,a,tioil phase of 
AC-FFI. Thus, t,he verification phase of AC-FFI needs to verify every st,ep in t,he comput.at.ion 
phase. 
Key steps of AC-FFI's coinput.at.ion pllasc arc providcd in Algorithin 2. The prot,ocol ad0pt.s 
a secure signat,ure scheme deiloted by Sign (e.g.. RSA [17]) which is used during t,he verification 
process. I11 order t.o fit. t.he domaill of a digital signa.ture scheine, we also use a has11 fuilct,ioil (e.g., 
SHA 1151; AID5 [18]) t.o co1nput.e the hash value of an illtended message and t,heil sign the hash 
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value instead. We also assume that both parties agree on a randoin permutation .ir to prevent 
the verifier 1' in Algorithi~i 3 froin seeing the private inputs of both parties. Other parts of the 
computatioii phase are identical to SSLlC-FFI. 
A l g o r i t h m  2 AC-FFI Prot.0~01 - Coinput~at.ion phase 
- 
Requi re :  GI.  ,C2. E:  Sign.  H ,  where 113 1 = 117~1 = m,: E has cert,ified public key parameters, Sign is 
a scc.111-e signature sclleine and H is a has11 fuilct~ion 
I :  P I :  Gi t .ir(G): send [ H ( q ) :  Signpl (H(f$))] t.o P2; 
2: P2: 
(a). A b o r t  if H(r ' j )  and S i g n p l ( H ( q ) )  cannot be verified: 
(a). A b o r t  if H($) and Signp2(H($))  canilot be verified: 
(b) .  Enciypt q :  x, - E(r, q [i]). for 7 = 1.. . . . nz: 
?- is randomlv choseil for each Ci [ i ] :  
(c) . Set X = T I .  . . . . :I,, and send [X. Signpl (H (X))]  to  P2. 
(a) .  A b o r t  if X and Signpl (H(X)) cannot be verified 
(b).  Coinpute 6 + JJVzA?';[tl=l x1 1 
(c) . Send [8. ~ i g n p 2  (H (8))] t.o P I .  
5: P l :  
(a) .  A b o r t  if 8 and s i g n p 2 ( ~ ( 8 ) )  canilot be verified 
(b).  Con1put.e 6 +- ~ ( 8 )  
(c). Send [6. Signpl (H ( G ) ) ]  to  P2. 
6: P2: A b o r t  if 6 and Signpl (H(6))  cannot, be verified 
Tlle \7erification pliase of AC-FFI is presented in a,lgorithm 3. The verificatioil phase is basically 
a reconstruct,ioil of what. act.ually occurred during t,he comput.at.ion phase by using the permuted 
i11put.s and inessages sent during t,he coinputation phase. Steps 1 and 2 in algoritllin 3 require P1 
and P2  t,o send t,he messages they received during the computation phase. 
At st,ep 3. t.he verifier exainines (via (a) ,  (c) and (e)) if every message P 1  sent is valid and 
exainines (via (b)  and (d))  if P 1  correct,ly performed every required computat.ion. Because P 1  is 
required t.o seild hhree inessages aad t.o perform t.wo coinputat.ioi~s, t.he t.asks conducted by the 
verifier at st.ep 3 is complete in validat,ing P l ' s  behavior. The iinpleineilt,atioil of step 4 follows the 
same reasoniilg in validating P2's behavior, and consequent,ly, we say that  the verification phase is 
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Algorithm 3 AC-FFI protocol: Verification phase 
Require: H: E: where H aad E a.re used in t.he cornput.at.ion phase 
1:  P1: send Ipl = [$ ; SignP2(H ( 4 ) ) :  9; s ~ ~ I z ~ ~ ( H ( ~ ) ) ]  and D (decrypt,ion key) t.o t,he verifier V: 
2: P2: send Ip2 = [4. Signpl ( ~ ( 4 ) ) :  X , Signpl ( H ( X ) ) ;  6; Signpl (H(b))]  to  V; 
3: When P2 is honest,, V can catch P1 cheating if: 
(a). q and Signpl ( H  ( q  )) are not. consist.ent; 
(b). D ( X )  # i7;; 
(c). X and Sign.pl ( H ( X ) )  are not consistent; 
(d). ~ ( 8 )  # b: 
(e). b and Sign.pl(H(6)) are not consistent.. 
4: IVhen P1 is honest,, V can cat,ch P2 cheat,iilg if: 
(a). i$ and SignP2(H(i&)) are not  consistent^; 
(c). 8 and signp2(H (8)) are not consistent. 
comp1et.e regarding I?,, 3 .  
4.3.1 Security and Soundness of AC-FFI 
The key difference between SSI\/IC-FFI and AC-FFI's coinputatioil phase is that the inessages P1 
and P2 receive in AC-FFI coiltain additional signat,ures, but. t,he signatures do not convey any more 
information than the messages t.hemselves. Therefore; t.he securit,y ailalysis of AC-FFI is the same 
as that. of SSIVIC-FFI, refer t,o [7; 211 for more details. Next., we show t,hat t,he verificatioil phase of 
AC-FFI is sound. 
Claim 1 The veri.fication phase of AC-FFI is sound (defin.ition 3) provided that one of the two 
parties is honest and the verzfication phase is complete in verifying the accountable behavior 
associated with A C-FFI. 
PROOF. Since we have showed that  the verification phase is complete, to  prove this claim, we only 
need to  sho~v ally inalicious behavior ca,n be detected as long as one party is honest. First., suppose 
P2 is honest.. Then t.he verifier is cert,ain that  Ip2 is legitimat,e. Based on the three signat.ures 
coiltailled in IP2; the verifier can determine (through st.eps 3(a),3(c) and 3(e) in algoritllin 3) the 
valic1it.y of in Ipl and two inessages t,hat P1 sent. a t  st.eps 3(c) and 5(c) in the colnputat.ioil phase 
(algorit,hm 2). 
Once t,he verifier coilfirins 'lti ill Ipl is 1egitiinat.e: t,he verifier (using the decryption key D at  st.ep 
3(c) in algorit,hin 3) can det,eriniile if X ~ v a s  computed correctly at. step 3(b) in the computation 
phase. If anything is inconsist.ent,, eit.her D is the incorrect. key or P1 did not. encrypt. GIl properly. 
Either way, t,he verifier call cat,cll P1 cheating. After this, t,lle verifier call confirm whether or not 
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D is valid, and consequent.lj~, the verifier can coilfirin t,he validit*y of the calculation at step 5(b) in 
algorit.hin 2. 
Tlle above analyses sho\v a comp1et.e reconstruction of xvhat P1 act.ual1y did in t.he comput.ation 
phase. Since P2 is honest., any iilcoilsisteilcy in t.he reconst.ruction process leads to the fact t,hat P2 
did behave maliciously during t,he coinputatioil phase. Therefore, P1 cannot mislead t,he verifier 
in the verifica.tion phase as long as P2 is honest,. On t,he other hand, if P1 is honest, based on the 
same reasoning: P2 cannot, mislead t,he verifier either. TVe can conclude that t,he verificat.ion phase 
of AC-FFI is sound. [7 
Note t,llat for t.he verificat,ion phase, we did not coilsider t,he sit,uation where the protocol 
t.er1ninat.e~ preinat.urely. The abort.ing of a prot,ocol is a very complex issue because inany fa.ct,ors 
could be involved. It would be very int.erest,ing t.o design a verification process that handles such 
sit,uat,ions. 
4.3.2 Advantages of AC-FFI 
So far, we have provided a real-life applicat,ioil t.hat. shoxvs the promise of the AC-framework. 
Coinpariilg to the SSi\;IC-FFI protocol, the coillput,at,ioil phase of the AC-FFI protocol addit,ioilally 
needs t,o coillput,e 5 hash values and 5 digital signat.ures, but these calculat,ioils a.re negligible. The 
has11 cost, is based on t,he size of the vector, but. it is a very small cost compared t,o t.l~e cost. of 
hoinoinorphic encrypt,ion (xvhich must. also be applied t,o each item in the vector). The cost. of a. 
sigilat.ure is coinparable t.o the cost of an iildividual eilcryptioil because it. is applied to the hash 
value whose size is constant.. Thus the tot.al cost of the protocol remains doininat.ed by the cost 
of l~oinoinorpl~ically encrypt.ing the vect,ors, and it is not appreciably greater than that. of SSA/lC- 
FFI. I11 addition, because of a sound verificat.ion phase: t.he AC-FFI prot.0~01 in11erit.s significailt 
advant,age over t.he SSAJC-FFI prot,ocol in enforciilg honest. behaviors. 
The AC-FFI prot,ocol furt.her confirins our int.uit,ion: the coinputatioil phase of an AC-prot.0~01 
call be as efficient. as a SSA?C-prot,ocol. Furthermore: since inalicious behavior call be detected by 
the verificatioil process, t.he verificat,ioil phase provides part.icipating parties t,he incentive to follow 
t.he prot,ocol correct,ly; in ot,her words, part.icipat.ing partries are inore likely t,o out,put t,he correct 
result, under t,he AC-fra.ine\vork t,llan does a SAsIC-prot.0~01 secure under the semi-honest inodel. 
5 Conclusion / Future Work 
Confident.ialit;v is an extremely iinport.ant issue in data security. Even when different. data holders 
are alloxved t,o see each ot,her's data, they inay not choose to do so when t,hey collaborat,e to achieve 
a coininon goal because t.hey do not. want to get, accused that t,hey are t,he ones t.o disclose certain 
confident,ial inforinat,ion. I11 this paper, we present. the accountable computing (AC) framework 
that alloxvs a,n honest. party to prove innoceilce t.o a. third independent entitry wheil it. llas followed 
a prot,ocol correctly. Such a framework has much pot,eilt,ial in practice since it. provides more 
iilceiltives for a, part.y to behave honestly. 
A SSA!IC-prot,ocol, if follo\ved, prevents inforinat.ion disclosure. However, it. inay be possible 
for a dishonest. part,y t,o undet,ectably cause disclosure by not. following the protocol correct.1~. At. 
t.he ot,her end of t,he spectrum, a protocol secure under t,he malicious inodel definit,ely erases t,hese 
securit.y concerns. Nevert,heless, efficient inalicious prot,ocols appear to be difficult, t,o design. The 
AC-framework provides a party verifiability, and it,s general st,ruct,ure allows possible design of inore 
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efficient prot,ocols than t,he inalicious model because the verificatioil process does not need to  be 
carried out during the execut,ioil of an AC-protocol. 
Under the AC-framework, we do not explicitly st.ate the penalty relat,ed to  t.lle detectioil of 
malicious behaviors in t,he verification phase. I11 practice, t.his can be addressed througli con- 
tract. signing: and before using any AC-protocol, both part,ies should agree on the penalty should 
inalicious behavior be detected. 
I11 t,he paper, we also presented a secure finding frequent. iteinsets protocol tliat nleet,s the 
defiilitioils of the AC-frame- work. The protocol is nearly as efficient as it,s coui~terpart in t,he 
semi-honest model. Ail honest. participating party call verify it,s honesty to a t,l~ird ent,it,y. The 
disclosure in the verificatioil process is very limited t,o t , l~e  fact t,l~at. the verifier only sees the 
perinut,ed inputs and all the coinputat,ions performed are based on t.he permuted input,s as n~ell. 
Future work iilcludes prot,ocols supporting zero-knowledge proofs t , l~at  are efficient at  coinputat~ion 
time (alt.houg11 perhaps expensive to verify). I11 addit,ioil, a.s ineilt,ioned previously, better dealing 
1vit11 preina,ture t,erinina,t,ion of an AC-protocol would be also very int.erest.iilg for fut,ure research. 
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